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I. INTRODUCTION
The Limits of International Law' stands on the shoulders of international
relations realists who have traditionally argued that international law does not
affect interstate relations and is therefore unworthy of much scholarly
attention.' International law scholars have in many ways set out to disprove
the realist claim and explain the sources and effects of law as separate from
politics: Why do states, which are driven primarily (according to realist theory)
by a need to protect and expand security interests, insist on using international
law at all? In Limits, Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner engage both the
international relations and international law scholarship to answer that
question with a short, simple, and in many ways appealing, rational choice
twist on realism: "International law emerges from states acting rationally to
maximize their interests given their perceptions of the interests of other states
and the distribution of state power.",3  According to the Limits thesis,
international law is what states create as a result of interstate relations, but it
does not affect state behavior in the way most international law scholarship
assumes.
Few international law scholars would argue with the notion that state actors
in the international system operate in ways which, in large part, seek to further
their interests. An understanding of instrumentalism in state behavior is
valuable and has been a theme of international law scholarship for some time.
Goldsmith and Posner, however, make the broader claim that international law
can never be an exogenous constraint on state behavior and that therefore
"some global problems may simply be unsolved."4 They reject the full range
of other explanatory and predictive theories about how international law
affects behavior while privileging their own simplifying theory above other
competing, but not necessarily exclusive, claims about international law. This
blanket rejection of alternative theories and explanations is the central
shortcoming of the Limits thesis, a shortcoming that is most apparent where
Goldsmith and Posner apply their approach to international human rights law.
' JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE Lirrs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
2 HANS MORGENTHAU, PoLrTcs AMONG NATIONS (1940).
3 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 8.
4 Id. at 225-26.
' See Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits ofInternational Law, 84 TEx. L. REv.
(forthcoming 2006) (reviewing JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LiMITs OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)).
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The Limits theory of human rights is formulated primarily as a response to
the theory that states comply with international law because of the "pull" of
compliance or a sense of obligation to comply with treaties (pacta sunt
servanda) that arises from fair and legitimate legal processes.6 This is a classic
straw man. While it is true that some international law scholarship has relied
on that normative assumption,7 the last decade has been marked by a shift
toward examination of norm compliance from a range of alternative and
interdisciplinary perspectives that seek to explain how international human
rights norms alter behavior within a state. These additional explanations have
been helpful for understanding the role of international human rights law in
changing human rights practices.
Transnational legal process theory, for example, posits that through
repeated participation in the international system individual government
officials and government agencies come to internalize and eventually adopt the
international rule as a behavioral habit.8 The theory of governmental networks,
claims that compliance results when transnational networks of governmental
agencies (including judicial networks) work together to harmonize regulation,
enforce law, and share information.9 Additional accounts rely on constructivist
notions that ideas transform behavior and look to the power of transnational
communities of interest and expertise on a particular issue, which share
information and coordinate responses across state borders.' Liberal theory
explains changes in human rights behavior as a result of domestic political
structures and processes." While none of these theories, on its own, supplies
a complete answer to the compliance question, each has explanatory and
6 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 14-15. See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWER OF
LEGrrIMACY AMONG NATIONS 24 (1990) (defining legitimacy as "a property of a rule or rule-
making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively
because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates
in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process").
7 See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705
(1988).
8 See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOuS. L. REV. 623 (1998).
9 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, ANEwWORLDORDER (2005); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture
of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International
Law, 43 VA. J. INT'LL. 1 (2002).
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621 (2004).
" Hans Peter Schmitz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 521 (2001).
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predictive value. Taken together, they serve as helpful complements to rational
choice theory.
Goldsmith and Posner lay out their claim as a descriptive or positive theory,
which they suggest should be judged, "on the extent to which it sheds light on
the problems of international law," 2 and I intend to limit my critique to that
metric. To what extent does the Limits theory shed light on current
international human rights problems and their solutions? The short answer is,
very little. As a starting point, the description of the human rights system in
Limits is hardly recognizable to many who study and practice in the human
rights field. That is largely because Goldsmith and Posner appear reluctant to
acknowledge that the international human rights system has entered a new
phase.13 Indeed, they spend a great deal of space in the chapter devoted to
human rights exploring the ways in which human rights were a factor in
international politics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 4 The fact is,
fifty years after the emergence of what is generally recognized as the modem
human rights era, the system is marked by both a rapid increase in legalization
of human rights norms and serious efforts to reform moribund and ineffective
human rights institutions. For example, international and supranational
adjudication of international human rights claims has grown significantly in
the past fifteen years with the creation of the ad hoc criminal tribunals for
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court (ICC),
the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights, and the expansion
of state membership in the European Charter. Moreover, vast networks of
private and public actors--of a kind virtually unheard of at the time the U.N.
12 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 8.
"3 Id. at 107. Part of the reason they may not acknowledge this new phase is the fact that
their own theory is part of a broader discourse about the wisdom of applying international norms
in domestic courts. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of
International Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997); infra Part V
(discussing normative claims of book).
14 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 112-15. Goldsmith and Posner assert that it is
"misleading" to view the current international human rights regime as "novel post-World War
II developments" because international law regulation has concerned itself with internal state
regulation, such as protection of foreign investment, prohibitions against the slave trade, and
protection of foreign nationals against denials of justice. Id at 107. But these examples
demonstrate the historical centrality of states in the international system; the protection of
nationals and investments was at best derivative of the sending state's interest in asserting its
sovereignty over the activities of its nationals, even when they were outside their home territory.
The multilateralism of post WWII was new-albeit largely premised on the failed multilateralism
of the League and the interwar bilateral agreements in Europe.
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was founded-are providing conduits for the transfer of human rights norms
into domestic legal systems. At the same time, the international community is
working to review and reform the flawed and failed political human rights
mechanisms within the United Nations, including working toward the creation
of a Human Rights Council to overcome legitimate criticisms that the U.N. has
failed in its task of human rights protection by allowing extreme human rights
abuses, such as Libya and Sudan, to have chairs on the Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC).
Against this backdrop, the rational choice theory in Limits is useful for
understanding some of the current political trends in international human
rights. It is of much more limited value for understanding human rights law.
First, the book largely ignores the effect of international human rights legal
institutions (e.g., ad hoc and permanent courts) on a range of state and
individual behavior. Second, the exclusive focus on interstate behavior ignores
the domestic dimension of human rights compliance, which is central to
changes in human rights conditions. Third, by ignoring the role of individuals,
NGOs, corporations, and other non-state actors, the book paints a distorted
picture of the current processes through which human rights norms are
elaborated and enforced. Fourth, the book draws overly broad conclusions
from limited empirical data about the effect of legalization on human rights
behavior. Finally, the discussion of human rights cannot be separated from the
explicit normative claims of the book, i.e., that states should not act on the
basis of moral values or the basis of perceived cosmopolitan duties, or the
implicit normative claim that international law should not constrain state
behavior.
For those who share the goal of improving the general human condition
(and I realize that is not the goal of Limits), there is value in understanding
rational choice and the constraints rationality may place on certain institutional
designs. There may also be room and, arguably, a need in the discussion of
international human rights for a "middle theory,"'5 one that understands that
most actors in the system act in instrumental ways, but that also acknowledges
the importance of liberal democratic theory in explaining domestic political
development and draws on constructivist understandings of how norms and
transnational process alter interests and affect behavior. This Essay aims to
15 Daniel Bodansky suggested this term during the roundtable discussion. See Daniel
Bodansky, International Law in Black and White, 34 GA. J. INT'L&COMP. L. 285 (2006) (noting
the need for non-instrumentalist theories to explain international behavior).
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illustrate that a hybrid approach can offer a more complete and useful account
of human rights behavior and explain how law shapes that behavior.
II. THE LIMITS OF STATE INSTRUMENTALISM
For each state actor the international human rights regime presents two
separate, but closely interrelated, questions. The first is whether and to what
extent a state cares about the human rights practices in other states. The
second is whether and to what extent a state is interested in committing itself
to international human rights standards. The Limits theory answers both
queries together: States sign on to human rights treaties to the extent that doing
so is in the "state interest." State interest is defined by reference to the interest
of the state's political leadership' 6-including dictators, absolute monarchs,
corrupt cleptocrats, as well as democratically elected leaders accountable to
and reflective of their constituencies. States thus "have an interest in the well-
being of persons under their control," but a "weaker interest in the well-being
of persons in other states."' 7
In the Limits formulation, a state's preference for how it treats its own
inhabitants results from balancing individual rights against national security.
A state will therefore abuse the human rights of its own inhabitants when it
believes doing so will promote national security." The assumption that human
rights violations result from rational calculations about national interests fits
neatly into the broader rational choice model, but it is misleading. Recent
interdisciplinary studies explain human rights conditions in states in relation
to specific economic, sociological, religious, and psychological processes. 9
A rational balancing of national security interests is one explanation for states'
abuse of their own inhabitants or, in the context of interstate war, their abuse
of inhabitants of other states.20 But it ignores helpful alternative hypotheses
about why, for example, individual agents of a state engage in atrocities,2'
16 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 6.
17 Id. at 109.
18 Id.
'9 Schmitz & Sikkink, supra note 11, at 518-20.
20 Id. at 518-19.
21 Id. at 520 (citing PHILIP GoUREvrrcH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE
WIu.L BE KILLED Wrr OuR FAmiuEs: STUDIES FROM RWANDA (1998); Ervin Staub, Summary
and Conclusions: The Societal and Psychological Origins of Genocide and Other Atrocities, in
THE ROOTS OF EVIL (Ervin Staub ed., 1989)).
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discriminate against racial minorities,22 or keep women in subordinate societal
roles." Any theory that seeks to account for the effect of legal sanctions on
human rights behavior should acknowledge these components. To the extent
that the Limits theory fails to do so, it proves too little. To the extent it
assumes that the full range of possible causal agents of human rights violations
are merely elements of state preference, it proves too much. In either case, its
assumption about the content of state preference is inaccurate.
Goldsmith and Posner suggest that a state's interest in the treatment of
people in other states might derive from rational calculations about the impact
of human rights compliance around the world on a state's ability to increase
security and economic welfare, and might even include a preference for
universal human rights in its interstate dealings. 24 But it is a weak interest,
which tends not to be of central concern in signing treaties.
Adopting the same rational choice formula they apply to other treaties, the
Limits authors posit that a state will join a human rights treaty when the treaty
does not require a change in behavior ("coincidence of interest"), or because
the state fears retaliation or some other reputational loss ("coercion").25
Coincidence of interest occurs where states sign onto agreements that merely
replicate domestic arrangements or where a state attaches reservations that
limit its obligations to status quo domestic obligations. Coercion occurs where
states refrain from exercising sovereignty over human rights conditions in their
own territory in order to gain something from other states.26 For example,
states in transition may agree to human rights obligations as part of a peace
settlement, in order to gain direct development assistance or other club goods,
such as access to trade preferences.27
22 Schmitz & Sikkink, supra note 1I (citing DANIEL J. GOLDHAGEN, HrILER'S WILLING
EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST (1996)).
23 Marilou McPhedran et al., THE FIRST CEDAW IMPACT STUDY: FINAL REPORT 17-26
(2000).
24 A preference for human rights might be based on, for example, a theory of democratic
peace or the value of free societies on free trade. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 110.
It might also include a preference for morality or cosmopolitanism, but Goldsmith and Posner
see those as inappropriate elements of state preference. Id. at 205.
' "If each state would engage in the same action for self-interested reasons regardless of
what the other state does, then there would be no reason to invest resources to enter an
agreement codifying the behavior." GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 88-90.
26 Coordination, where "states receive higher payoffs if they engage in identical or
symmetrical actions than if they do not," id., does not apply in the human rights context.
27 The example Goldsmith and Posner use is the Versailles Treaty. Id. at 90 (asserting that
cooperation in making the treaty made the parties better off than if there had not been an
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Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that coincidence of interest and
coercion occur in the international human rights context without legal
agreements, but nonetheless assert that states choose treaties over nonlegal
arrangements on the basis of the cooperation rationale.2" The cooperation
rationale comes into play where "states reciprocally refrain from activities...
that would otherwise be in their immediate self-interest in order to reap larger
medium- or long-term benefits."29 States agree to be bound, rather than make
nonbinding declarations, because treaties offer additional dimensions that
assist the informational aspects of cooperation. Under the authors' broad
theory, states will generally prefer treaties over nonbinding declarations
because treaties (1) require domestic legislative consent and, therefore, convey
important information about state preferences; (2) implicate default rules (e.g.,
the interpretive rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); and
(3) convey a more serious commitment than non-binding agreements.3" Each
of these cooperation rationales assumes an interstate collective action problem
where agreement can facilitate communication and create a focal point for
overcoming the repeated bilateral prisoner's dilemma, a dilemma which is
generally inapposite to the human rights regime.3'
The international human rights system cannot be explained or aided by the
bilateral prisoner's dilemma, because, despite being constructed from a web
of multilateral treaties, the international human rights system does not centrally
address itself to interstate behavior (bilateral or multilateral) but rather to
domestic conditions. None of the core tenets of the six central human rights
treaties addresses the substance of state obligations to one another.32 Rather,
agreement).
28 Id. at 88-89.
29 Id. at 12.
30 Id. at91.
a" The bilateral prisoner's dilemma is a two-party game in which the welfare of one party
depends on the moves of the other party. Without knowledge of how the other party will act, the
rational move of each party will reduce both parties pay off. Cooperation between the parties
facilitates information and maximizes the pay off for both parties.
32 International Covenant on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention against Torture
and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1456.
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they are aimed at a state's conduct with regard to its own inhabitants.33
Further, because the tenets are not reciprocal in nature,34 they are not generally
enforced by classic interstate actions, such as economic sanctions or military
intervention,35 and achieving compliance with human rights law does not
generally require the level of interstate cooperation necessary to resolve
collective action problems.36
Indeed, apart from the limited historical examples they present of bilateral
cooperation on the question of minority religious rights and the campaign to
end the slave trade, 37 Goldsmith and Posner essentially concede that modem
international human rights treaties do not reflect "robust cooperation., 31 Why
then, if treaties add nothing that is not either already being done ("coincidence
" A small number of human rights treaties create specific obligations on states with respect
to treatment of non-nationals outside territorial borders. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259,
6261, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152. The requirement under the major human rights instruments that
individuals exhaust domestic remedies prior to raising a claim internationally distinguishes
human rights treaties from, for example, the WTO regime which explicitly disallows raising
domestic claims under the GATT. Compare, e.g., International Covenant or Civil and Political
Rights, Opt. Prot. 1, art. 2, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter ICCPR] (limiting
individual complaints to the Committee on Human Rights to individuals "who have exhausted
all available domestic remedies"), with Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994)
(noting that WTO members are obligated to seek recourse only through the DSU rules).
3 See Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation
in Postwar Europe, 54 INT'LORG. 217 (2000) ("[I]nternational human rights institutions are not
designed primarily to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across
borders, but to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities.").
35 Id. The use of sanctions has generally been restricted to cases where human rights
violations accompany ideologically opposed regimes (United States against Cuba) or threats to
peace and security (U.N. sanctions against Iraq, Libya, Iran). See HENRY STEINER & PHILIP
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 662-72 (2000). I am setting aside here
the question of intervening with military force solely on the basis of human rights violations.
See NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000). But Goldsmith and Posner are correct in noting that, despite
a number of situations in recent decades where such humanitarian intervention might have taken
place, it infrequently has. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 213-14.
36 There are a handful of notable exceptions, including the law governing the treatment of
refugees, which requires some degree of cooperation and coordination between states to ensure
the obligation of non-refoulement (non-return of individuals to a persecuting state) is met. See
GuY GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (1996).
37 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 113.
31 Id. at 119.
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of interest") or which could more effectively be achieved through bilateral
sanctions ("coercion"), do states go to the trouble of creating legal agreements
over human rights?
Goldsmith and Posner are left with weak residual rationales. They first
claim that some improvement in human rights conditions occurs through the
drafting and ratification process, including the creation of reporting
procedures.39 Second, they argue that a treaty like the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) may simply be a way for liberal
democracies to announce a "code of conduct" on which aid, trade concessions
and other diplomatic benefits might be conditioned.' Under this rationale,
treaties provide a blueprint for the "standards of civilization."4
They provide no evidence for the first proposition. Constructivist scholars
in political science have noted that negotiations leading up to ratification and
ratification itself are steps in the process of norm creation and norm
compliance, but those stages are not deemed any more significant than the
actual effect of the norm on ongoing state behavior.42 Even if it could be
demonstrated that drafting and ratification have significant effects, Goldsmith
and Posner do not explain how the effects of drafting and ratifying a legally
binding instrument would be different from drafting and approving nonbinding
statements.43 As to the second rationale, it is of course the case that human
rights may improve as a result of cooperation and coercion in a bilateral
relationship." The fact that a treaty may provide an easy textual reference to
"the kinds of behavior that are deemed acceptable or not,"45 is not illuminating.
It is also inaccurate as an historical matter.
There are two important nonbinding, aspirational human rights
documents-the preamble to the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR).' Despite containing language that is nearly
31 Id. at 128.
4 Id.
41 Id.
42 See Schmitz & Sikkink, supra note 11, at 529.
4' For an example of a nonbinding statement see the joint statement on the occasion of the
World Conference on Human Rights, held at Vienna in 1993. Vienna Declaration andProgram
ofAction (July 12, 1993), available athttp://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/
A.CONF. 157.23.En?OpenDocument.
44 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 128.
45 Id.
' See Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1998) (the UDHR is an "agreement across cultures"). The UDHR
has been invoked as "the fountainhead or constitution or grand statement of the human rights
[Vol. 34:393
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identical to the UDHR,47 the ICCPR was drafted precisely because the UDHR
was deemed inadequate in that it was nonbinding and merely hortatory.48
Certain states, including the United States, were reluctant to sign onto the
ICCPR because they did not want to be bound to enforce it domestically, not
because they disagreed with it as a "code of civilization."49 Indeed, the United
States had long used coercive measures to pursue human rights issues in
bilateral and multilateral relationships before it signed onto the ICCPR. It did
not require a treaty to provide a code of conduct. 50
Goldsmith and Posner do not deny the existence of international law or, by
extension, the existence of international human rights law. But after reviewing
the rationales they offer for preferences for binding obligations, as opposed to
mere pledges, we seem to be left with a theory not of law but of politics:
International human rights policy emerges from states acting rationally to
maximize their interests given their perceptions of the interests of other states
and the distributions of state power.51 This reflects a classic realist assessment
of diplomatic behavior and as such is a useful explanatory device. It is
undoubtedly true that in the United States, for example, the preference for
taking into account human rights practices of other states has emerged
separately from the decision to undertake treaty obligations.5 2 The problem is
that rational action as a matter of foreign policy does not explain why a state
has a preference for obligating itself to fulfill the terms of an international
movement...." ALSTON & STEINER, supra note 35, at 143.
47 Compare the provisions of Articles 1-21 of UDHR, with Articles 6-27 of the ICCPR.
48 ALSTON & STEINER, supra note 35, at 142-45.
49 See, e.g., the Bricker debates in the United States. Many other countries shared this
concern, see, e.g., ALSTON & STEINER, supra note 35, at 150 (citing H. LAUTERPRECHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1950), on the general "rejection of the legal duty"
to give effect to the rights in the UDHR); Moravcsik, supra note 34 (noting that the United
Kingdom was one of three Council of Europe states initially opposed to language in the
European Convention on Human Rights that would be bind member states' domestic legal
systems).
'0 The United States ratified the ICCPR in 1990; the adoption of human rights as an element
in bilateral relations is placed at 1977, the first year of the Carter administration. See note 52
infra.
5 See Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to
Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH. J. INT'LL. 143 (2001).
52 That preference was expressed through congressional statute in 1977, requiring the U.S.
State Department to provide annual reports to Congress on global human rights conditions. 22
U.S.C. § 2304 (2005) (sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as
amended) and section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended)). This came into effect before
the United States became a party to the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture.
2006] 403
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treaty or how such a legal obligation, once undertaken, affects human rights
practices or the decision of other actors in the international community to press
for changes to a state's human rights practices.
The rational choice analysis becomes more useful as a predictive tool if we
clearly distinguish between international human rights law and policy. A few
of the central human rights institutions, such as the U.N. Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) and the U.N. Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), are
mechanisms not of assessment or adjudication of legal claims, but of interstate
politics. They have been politicized in ways that can be counterproductive to
the project of improving human rights conditions. 3 UNHRC for example, has
allowed egregious human rights violators like Sudan and Libya to assume
leadership positions, and conveyed to them the concomitant power to veto
investigations and sanction recommendations. Rational choice models are
important in understanding, as both a prescriptive and predictive matter, how
these institutions can and should be reformed to take into account impediments
to interstate cooperation. There is currently consensus that the UNHRC is
broken and that a Human Rights Council that could more effectively engage
the tools of cooperation and coercion may be needed.54  Explicit
acknowledgement and understanding of the kinds of rational choice limits to
3 Schmitz & Sikkink, supra note 11, at 527 ("Charter-based human rights institutions at the
U.N. have been much more politicized than the treaty-based institutions.").
' The 2004 Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change concluded that U.N. Human Rights Commission's ability to carry out its mission of
protecting human rights globally "has been undermined by eroding credibility and
professionalism," and joined recommendations that the Commission be opened to universal
membership. A MORE SECURE WORLD: OUR SHARED RESPONSIBLITY 89 (2004), http://www.
un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf. Similarly, Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated that the
"Commission on Human Rights suffers from declining credibility and professionalism, and is
in need of major reform." IN LARGER FREEDOM 5 (2005), http://www.un.org/largerfreedom
executivesummary.pdf. The U.N. member states agreed at the World Summit in September 2005
to work toward replacing the Commission with a Human Rights Council. See 2005 WORLD
SUMMrr OUTCOME, 33, para. 160 (2005), http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/
60/PDF/NO548760.pdf?OpenElement. See also Options Paper Human Rights Council (2005)
presented by Ambassadors Ricardo Alberto Arias and Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo, Co-Chairs
of the HRC Negotiations to Ambassador Jan Eliasson, President of the General Assembly,
available at http://www.eyeontheun.org/assets/attachmentsdocuments/options-paper-on.hr-
council.pdf. Prominent human rights NGOs support the idea of replacing UNHRC with a
Council. See Joint NGO Statement, Nov. 22, 2005, www.unwatch.org/speeches/JoinLstatement
_onHRC.html; Amnesty International's Ten-point Program for the Creation of an
Authoritative andEffective Human Rights Council, Nov. 1,2005, http://web.amnesty.org/library/
Index/ENGIOR410682005 ?open&of=ENG-393.
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interstate politics that Goldsmith and Posner describe are important to that
project of institutional reform and design.
Yet a foreign policy of human rights--even a multilateral one-can exist
without human rights treaties. The rather unsurprising conclusion that states
are in part instrumental in pursuing human rights policies does not necessarily
imply, as Goldsmith and Posner suggest, that international human rights law
has little or no exogenous effect on state behavior. To understand why states
enter treaties and/or comply with them requires a more complete description
of international human rights laws and legal (as distinct from primarily
political) institutions and also of the ways in which other theories (the ones
about whose claims Goldsmith and Posner are skeptical) account for the
effects of law and institutions.55
I. How INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AFFECTS STATE BEHAVIOR
Some international human rights treaties create direct enforcement
mechanisms that are binding on states. These are distinct from institutions
controlled through ongoing intergovernmental decision making bodies (e.g.,
the UNHRC and ECOSOC). They are created through interstate agreement
and then left to operate relatively independently, with minimal oversight.
Examples include the ECHR, the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
and U.N.-sponsored courts in Sierra Leone, East Timor, and Kosovo.56
Institutions created under international human rights treaties themselves
interpret treaty law, elaborate norms, and apply law in ways that frequently are
contrary to the interests of a state that participated in creating them. And,
contrary to the Limits theory, state behavior is altered by them.
A. Institutional Effects on Behavior
The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is an
example of an adjudicatory institution that fundamentally altered state
behavior in ways not anticipated by the member states of the Security Council
that created it. Goldsmith and Posner use the ICTY to illustrate their claim
that coercion, not the rule of law, brings about compliance with human rights
norms: "The tribunal has had modest success is trying war criminals, including
55 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 83-91.
56 INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR,
Kosovo AND CAMBODIA (Cesare P.R. Romano et al. eds., 2005).
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Slobodan Milosevic. But it was not the gravitational pull of the ICTY charter
that lured those defendants to the Hague. Rather, it was NATO's (and
primarily American) military, diplomatic and financial might."57 The effects
of the tribunal on the very states that supported its creation, as well as on the
parties to the conflicts in the Balkans, are quite different and more complex
than Goldsmith and Posner portray them. Once the tribunal was created in
1992 (almost as an afterthought to one of the many failed peace processes in
Bosnia), the international community could and did ignore its work rather than
throw its diplomatic and military might behind it, as Goldsmith and Posner
suggest. But only up to a point. Even as it was subject to the vicissitudes of
cooperation and funding from the Western powers, the work of the tribunal
took on a dynamic of its own, affecting both the terms of the peace in Bosnia
(and later Kosovo) and which actors were able to participate in the peace
process.59
One important incident illustrates how the tribunal served as an exogenous
influence on the behavior of the United States, rather than the other way
around. Shortly after the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995,6 Bosnian Serb
leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander Ratko Mladic were
indicted by the ICTY.6" The United States, which had taken over the lead role
57 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 116. The first defendant tried by the ICTY,
Dusko Tadic, was actually transferred to the Hague by the German government under the
complementarity principles of the ICTY statute, well before the United States took the lead in
the peace process and two years before the NATO bombings of Kosovo began. PAUL WILLIAMS
& MICHAEL SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE 114-15 (2003).
" The ICTY had a small staff, minuscule budget, and few resources of its own. See David
Rohde, War Crime Probe in Ex-Yugoslavia Mired by Red Ink, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Oct.
6, 1995, at 1; Ray Bonner, U.N. Fiscal Woes Are Said to Threaten War Crime Tribunals, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, at A8. It depended heavily on cooperation from western intelligence
agencies to gather information to build cases. By dragging their heels on such cooperation,
France, Great Britain and the United States could maintain the appearance of support for the
tribunal, while not exposing themselves to criticism for failing to intervene militarily to end the
fighting. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Says it is Withholding Data from UN War Crimes Panel, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 1995, at A10.
'9 Cooperation with the tribunal was, in the end, a central term in the Dayton Accords.
6o Srebrenica had been designated a "safe haven" by the U.N. Between July 4-6, 1995, the
enclave was overrun by Ratko Mladic and Bosnian Serb military forces. The U.N. peacekeepers
handed over the Bosnian Muslim residents of the protected area to Mladic, who then ordered and
oversaw mass killings of approximately eight thousand Bosnian Muslim men and boys. That
event proved to be a turning point for NATO bombings against Serb positions and set the stage
for the Dayton process. Melanie C. Greenberg & Margaret E. McGuinness, From Lisbon to
Dayton, in WORDS OVER WAR 60 (Melanie C. Greenberg et al. eds., 2000).
61 Karadzic was the elected prime minister of Republika Srpksa, a self-proclaimed
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in the diplomatic process of negotiating between the Bosniacs, Serbs and
Croats from the EU and the U.N., had earlier considered Karadzic a credible
representative of Republika Srpska, and he had traveled without threat of arrest
to cities outside the region to attend peace talks.62 Following the indictment,
Karadzic could not travel to any U.N. member state without fear of arrest
because the terms of the tribunal's statute required any host state to arrest him
and transfer him to the Hague to stand trial.63 Despite noting, on the eve of the
Dayton negotiations, that cooperation with the ICTY would "not be a show
stopper,"' the United States was, in part, forced by the consequences of a legal
prosecution it did not fully control65 but under which it felt legally (if not
morally) bound to comply, to alter its course.' Similarly, once Milosevic was
deposed and ultimately transferred to the Hague to stand trial, the work of the
ICTY--operating completely outside the territory of the former
Yugoslavia-had an enormous effect on the opportunities for political
reconciliation, future regional political developments, and the adoption of
international human rights standards in domestic law.67 The ICTY has also
carried out, albeit imperfectly, its direct mandate to bring war criminals to
justice.68
autonomous republic within Bosnia. Despite the failures to achieve full intelligence cooperation,
the ICTY gathered enough information (much of it in the public domain as a result of NGO
activism and press reporting) to hand down indictments for those two Bosnian Serb leaders in
February 1995. Following the Srebrenica massacre, the indictment was made public. It was
amended in November 1995 to include charges arising from Srebrenica. Greenberg &
McGuinness, supra note 60.
62 Karadzic negotiated the winter ceasefire of 1994-1995 with former President Jimmy
Carter. Id. at 64-65.
63 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 29, May
25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY].
' See Greenberg & McGuinness, supra note 60, at 70.
65 The ICTY President is required under the statute to report annually to the Security
Council. ICTY, supra note 63, art. 34.
6 The United States had additional reasons to welcome the isolation of Karadzic by the time
Dayton began. Greenberg & McGuiness, supra note 60, at 64-65. Of course, the fact that the
United States withheld from the ICTY important information about Milosevic until after the
Dayton agreement was signed, demonstrates that instrumentalism often creeps into decisions
about cooperation with a tribunal, particularly where saving many lives may require delaying
prosecution. The point is that justice was not the central concern of the United States; peace
was. The ICTY altered the alternatives available to the United States.
67 For example, the tribunal influenced how the post-war political transition took place in
Serbia. See Tim Judah, The Fog of Justice, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Jan.15, 2004, at 23.
6' That Karadzic and Mladic are still at large (though clearly isolated and unable to act
publicly) might be seen as a failure of the Tribunal. But it can equally be viewed as the failure
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I do not intend to make a normative judgment here, but rather an empirical
observation about the way in which international legal processes affect state
behavior.69 Indeed, some might view this sort of exogenous effect on state
behavior as a threat to peace processes more generally, where the ability to
bargain away issues like prosecution of political leaders might be central to a
negotiated solution.7" Among the most valid objections to an independent ICC
(a nonindependent ICC being objectionable for more obvious reasons) is the
very ability of an ICC prosecution to alter the options available to a mediator
or the parties themselves to achieve a negotiated solution.7' Nonetheless, to
the extent that Limits fails to account for these independent effects on state
behavior, it is incomplete.72
B. Domestic "Lock-in" and Domestic Change
The Limits thesis is incomplete in that it fails to explain how international
law interacts with domestic legal institutions. International human rights law
addresses itself primarily to change on the domestic level. The doctrine of
exhaustion of state remedies, for example, requires that redress of a failure to
meet an international human rights obligation must first be sought at the state
level. Every regional and international human rights treaty incorporates this
of the "coercive" methods that Goldsmith and Posner claim are responsible for the Tribunal's
success.
69 With hindsight, the indictments of Karadzic and Mladic can be seen as either helpful or
damaging to the peace process. The helpful interpretation posits that they removed potential
"spoilers" from the process and forced the hand of Slobodan Milosevic to speak for and sign for
the Bosnian Serbs at Dayton. Greenberg & McGuiness, supra note 60, at 65. The damaging
interpretation is that, without the Republika Srpska there, the peace at Dayton was viewed as
unjust to the Bosnian Serbs and helped set the stage for the failure of cooperation that has
allowed Karadzic and Mladic to evade capture for over ten years.
70 Examples where this was the case are the El Salvador and South Africa truth and
reconciliation processes. Amnesties and exile have also been used in Haiti (in the cases of Baby
Doc Duvalier and Raoul Cedras).
71 The indictment by the International Criminal Court of several Lords Resistance Army
leaders in Uganda has been criticized on the grounds that it ended all hope of a negotiated
solution to that country's protracted civil war. Uganda Aide Criticizes Court Over Warrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2005, at 20.
72 Goldsmith has conceded elsewhere that the ICC will have an effect on state behavior and
choices, but that it "will not achieve its aims of eliminating, or even much reducing, impunity
for human rights violations." Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court,
70 U. CHi. L. REv. 89, 95 (2003). He goes so far as to argue that the ICC may actually increase
human rights violations. Id. at 95-101.
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requirement.73 Similarly, the International Criminal Court, which permits
direct supranational prosecution of certain criminal violations of international
human rights law, provides for "complementarity" of domestic prosecutions.74
Some states, as Goldsmith and Posner note, attach reservations to any treaty
obligation which expands individual causes of action under their domestic
legal system, and some states have simply refused to meet their obligation to
provide a direct claim of right. As I discuss below, advocacy groups have
recognized that importation of the language of international human rights into
domestic legal systems-through direct litigation, domestic legislative change,
and interactive processes with international and transnational tribunals-is
required to shift domestic behavior in states that either expressly limit the
extent of their obligation to improve human rights conditions or that brazenly
violate obligations they have undertaken.
Setting those two situations aside for the moment, why do some states
nonetheless agree to change their domestic legal systems to improve human
rights conditions? One explanation that stems from liberal theory is that states
choose treaties over nonbinding declarations in part to "lock-in" to the
domestic polity the values of the human rights commitment. States that are
most likely to need the domestic gains achieved by "locking in" their
commitments are those in transition-from colonialism to independence, or
from totalitarianism to democracy. International human rights treaties are
adopted during these transition periods as conditions of peace agreements; the
treaty text frequently is incorporated into new constitutions.75 Periods of
transition thus offer an opportunity for norm transformation,76 not only within
the states in transition, but within the communities of states with which they
interact. The countries of Western Europe, particularly Germany and Italy
" See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, art. 46, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art.
35, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; ICCPR, supra note 33.
" Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 17, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 18319, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. The two ad hoc tribunals for former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda treat complementarity differently. ICTY, supra note 63, art. 10 (noting that the
tribunals have concurrent jurisdiction with and primacy over national courts and allowing the
ICTY to request deference from a national court).
" The constitutions of several states either incorporate direct language from the ICCPR, or
require that their own bills of rights be interpreted in compliance with the UDHR or ICCPR. In
addition, many new constitutions directly incorporate international treaty obligations into
domestic law. See, e.g., CONsTrrLUON OF THE REPUBLIC OF SouTH AFRICA (1996).
76 See Christopher J. Borgen, Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The
Hegemony of Process, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. (forthcoming 2005).
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during the period immediately following World War II, fit this model. 77 After
the end of the Cold War, Eastern European states and the newly independent
states created out of the former Soviet Union also sought to "lock-in" domestic
change through treaty commitments. 7' Human rights NGOs and foreign
governments became more involved on the ground level in new democracies,
building domestic institutions based on international human rights law and
respect for the rule of law generally. International institutions and regional
organizations were active in assisting new states with domestic change that
would enable them to obtain future membership. 79 To be sure, some of the
agreements to adopt change at the domestic level can be accounted for as the
result of coercion by powerful states of weaker states. But that does not
diminish the outcome that the decision to join treaties has additionally "locked
in" changes in state behavior which remain even after the coercive measures
are no longer in place.
Moreover, the fact that states attach reservations to treaties does not
undermine the value of the "lock-in" theory. Because more developed
democracies have a longer tradition of observing human rights, they are the
states least likely to need to accede to international commitments related to
these domestic purposes and therefore most likely to attach reservations when
they do accede.80 Indeed, the initial intent of the United Nations human rights
system can be seen as part of the effort by the United States to get the fragile
" Moravcsik, supra note 34. Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that the European Charter
of Human Rights (ECHR) is the best example of an international human rights system that does
appear to exert an exogenous influence on states. But they explain the robustness of the system
as analogous to the shift from confederation to federation. In so doing, they (mistakenly)
conflate the ECHR and its place as part of the Council of Europe, which arose in the 1950s to
promote the rule of law and human rights (supported by the United States as part of the project
of promoting supranational restraints on the states of western Europe), with the emergence of
the European Community in the 1970s and 1980s and the EU in the 1990s. The United
Kingdom ratified the ECHR in 1951; it joined the common market of the European Economic
Community in 1973. The decision to ratify the ECHR was therefore quite separate from the later
decision to join the economic union. Further, given the failure of several member states to adopt
the EU Constitution in 2005, characterizing the EU as a federation analogous to the United
States in 1789 appears at best premature.
71 See Bardo Fassbender, The Better Peoples of the United Nations? Europe's Practice and
the United Nations, 15 EUR. J. INT'LL. 857 (2004); Herman Schwartz, The Internationalization
of Constitutional Law, 10 HuM. RTs. BRIEF 10 (2003).
79 See, e.g., NATO Partnership for Peace, available at http://www.nato.int/issus/ptp/.
8 See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L.J.
1935 (2002) (discussing why some democracies have better compliance records than others).
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emerging democracies in Western Europe to lock-in long-term commitments
for the purposes of strengthening the prospects of liberal democracy.8
C. Norm Transfer into Domestic Law and the Role of Non-state Actors
The Limits theory is incomplete for the additional reason that it relies on the
out-of-date assumption that states lie at the center of the international
order-including in the human rights area. While states act to "lock-in" norms
by means of international agreement, concluded at times of transition, the
norms and rules of the international human rights system are aimed not just at
the behavior of the aggregated political power of the state in its interstate
relations, but also at subsidiary political units and agencies, courts, individuals,
corporations, and other non-state actors. In addition to being subjects of the
law, these other actors play roles in elaborating, interpreting, and adopting
international norms-even in states that are not parties to the treaty in which
the particular human rights standard is elaborated. 2 The focus of human rights
engagement has thus shifted away from interstate diplomacy (and its rational
limits) toward work at the grassroots.
Goldsmith and Posner recognize the role of NGOs, but conclude that NGOs
do not depend much on international law because they, like states, will protest
human rights violations even when the abuser is not a signatory to a treaty.
The authors further dismiss many of the studies about the rise of NGOs and
their role in norm transfer as "unremarkable," noting that NGO activism has
been around for centuries.8 3 When they acknowledge the rise of NGOs in
human rights, they attribute it to technology.' While it is undoubtedly true
that NGOs can and do express concerns about human rights even absent a
binding treaty obligation, this observation is not inconsistent with other
observations about the important role NGOs play in situations where there is
a treaty upon which to base a claim of legal obligations and corresponding
rights.
NGOs are playing a larger and more aggressive role as transnational norm
entrepreneurs and plaintiffs in the international human rights system. Why?
One answer may be that the failure of international political bodies to effect
81 See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1971 (2004).
82 See Peter J. Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 195 (2004).
83 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 124-25 (discussing the studies by Risse and
Sikkink (1999)).
84 Id.
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change in human rights conditions has created a need to target efforts at the
domestic level.8 5 The failures of the UNHRC to grapple with the worst
systemic human rights abusers and of U.N. member states to halt ongoing mass
atrocities in Rwanda and the Darfur region of Sudan demonstrate that reliance
on the traditional mechanism of interstate diplomacy to address shortcomings
in human rights conditions is increasingly misplaced. As the problems of
certain intergovernmental processes become pronounced, NGOs look to direct
participation within states and across states to address problems.8 6 Many of
these NGOs, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, are
themselves transnational organizations beyond the reach of any one state.
Goldsmith and Posner conclude, in typically sweeping fashion, that the
body of constructivist literature fails to demonstrate that "human rights law
plays any special role., 8 ' But surely if international human rights law has any
effect on state behavior through the processes of norm transfer, that would
shed doubt on the sweeping claims of the Limits theory. Other actors are
affected by international human rights laws and institutions, and in turn, these
actors affect the way human rights conditions develop on the ground. Case
studies illustrate this phenomena.
The recent convergence of international efforts to limit and abolish the
death penalty and attempts to enforce individual rights under the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations protections for foreign nationals illustrates
the way in which norm transfer takes place, even in a large, powerful country.
The United States is not a signatory to Optional Protocol 2 of the ICCPR,
which abolishes the death penalty, but it is a party to the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations (VCCR) which was, until recently, a relatively non-
controversial multilateral treaty codifying the privileges, immunities, and
status of consular officers.8 8 Among the functions elaborated in the VCCR is
the protection of nationals who have been arrested or incarcerated in a foreign
85 See Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and International Law: Speaking Law to Power:
Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights, and the New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-
16 (2000).
86 Some NGOs have played a large role in keeping the failures of the intergovernmental
processes in the public eye. UN Watch is one example. See www.unwatch.org.
87 GOLDsMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 125. They dismiss in particular, the work of
Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of Human Rights Norms into Domestic
Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OFHUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONALLAW AND DOMESTIC
CHANGE 1-38 (Thomas Risse et al., eds. 1999).
88 Consular officers are not diplomats who serve as emissaries of the government on political
questions (though they can frequently fill that role), but rather they serve to protect the
commercial interests and the welfare of nationals of the sending state.
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state by providing, inter alia, that consular officers be notified of the arrest of
any of their nationals.
Until ten years ago, when anti-death penalty activists changed tactics, the
VCCR had not been invoked as providing a direct claim for a right arising
from an international human rights treaty. Around the mid-1990s, with
Optional Protocol 2 as their standard, a transnational network of human rights
activists, NGOs, and defense lawyers began a campaign to bring national
criminal justice systems into conformity with the abolition of the death penalty
in the ICCPR. In countries where capital punishment persisted-most notably
the United States-the network of these "norm entrepreneurs" worked to limit
the application of the death penalty through novel arguments rooted in
emerging international and foreign practices. Using the VCCR as a portal to
gain entry to United States courts was one of those entrepreneurial tactics.8 9
Starting with the case of a Canadian national convicted of a capital crime
in Texas, defense counsel and domestic and transnational NGOs initiated an
interactive process between and among international tribunals (the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and International Court of Justice
(ICJ)) and state and federal governments in a series of cases in which foreign
nationals faced the death penalty.' Foreign governments used the VCCR as
a means to get into court and take a stand against the application of the death
penalty to their nationals.9' Defense attorneys, some receiving active and
89 In 1992, Stan Faulder was the first defendant known to file a habeas petition based on a
violation of the notification provisions of the VCCR. Ex Pane Joseph Stanley Faulder, No.
10740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). Earlier cases raised consular rights violations, but these were
not based on claims of direct violation of the VCCR. See United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617
F.2d 529 (9th Cit. 1980); United States v. Coplon, 89 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). See also
William J. Aceves, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A Study of Rights, Wrongs,
and Remedies, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 257 (1998); William A. Schabas, International Law
and Abolition of the Death Penalty: Recent Developments, 4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 535
(1998).
0 The basis of the claim was that the foreign national defendants had not been informed of
their right to consular notification and that the consulate's failure to be aware of their case
caused prejudice. Remedies sought included excluding statements made prior to consular
notification and review and reconsideration on state and federal habeas grounds based in the 4th,
5th, and 6th amendments. See Ex Parte Faulder, No. 10740; Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529;
Coplon, 89 F. Supp. 664.
"1 Whether those foreign governments did so out of altruism toward co-nationals or as a
means to exert power over the United States or out of a sense of strong moral obligation to
oppose the death penalty is of no moment to this description of how the outside norms are
integrated in the United States. Nonetheless, there is strong evidence that in the cases brought
by Germany, Paraguay, and Mexico, strong anti-death penalty sentiment and support of the
20061
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monetary support from foreign governments, formed coalitions to seek review
and reconsideration in scores of cases between 1997 and 2005. Key points in
the process were the 1997 advisory opinion of the IACHR which stated that the
obligation to provide consular notice was incorporated into the due process
requirements of the ICCPR,92 and the 1998 decision of the ICJ that failure to
notify required a separate remedy, regardless of domestic procedural rules.93
In both cases, the rulings went against the United States. These efforts
produced a "norm cascade" on the question of consular notification in death
penalty cases: the United States government provided guidance and training
to state and local governments; state and local governments trained police and
courts; state and federal courts expanded procedural remedies for failure to
notify (including claims based on suppression of confessions and ineffective
assistance of counsel); and states began to consider and adopt legislation to
create a cognizable right in cases where notification has not taken place.94
To be sure, some of the behavior of the federal government in this case can
be attributed to instrumentalist acts. The United States was subject to an
interpretation of an obligation under an international treaty-the VCCR-with
which it did not agree. It then took steps to withdraw from at least that part of
the treaty that would subject it to future ICJ interpretation of disputes-an
entirely rational act given the outcome. And some courts have started to limit
the procedural remedy available to criminal defendants in the event that
notification is not made. But the part of the federal government that acts as
"the state" for the purpose of international relations was forced at many points
along the way to do things it had resisted doing before: engage in active
dialogue with local and state law enforcement authorities and conduct
trainings; request a stay of execution from a governor; and request review and
reconsideration of state habeas corpus petitions from a state governor." The
"international rule of law" played a role. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Mexican
States filed in Medellin. v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2088 (2005) at 14-16 (noting that Mexico involved
consular officers in death penalty cases dating back to at least 1920, and that the United States
recognizes Mexican assistance in death penalty cases as "extraordinary"); Plaintiff-Appellants
Brief, at 7-8, The Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 622 (C.A.4 Jan. 22, 1998).
92 Advisory Opinion OC -16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the
Framework of the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Inter-Am. Ctr. H.R. (Oct. 1, 1999).
"3 Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998
I.C.J. 99 Discont. (Nov. 1998). See also Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No. 128 (March 31).
9 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 834c and 5028 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642 (2005); but
see FLA. STAT. § 901.26 (2005).
" See Consular Notification and Access: Instructions for Federal, State and Local Law
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United States now faces a legal result that was clearly not its preference: a
change in the rule applied to foreign nationals in several state criminal justice
systems.96 This change in rule is, in turn, in combination with other efforts,
chipping away at the death penalty in the United States.
The VCCR line of cases illustrates in an international human rights context
what the political scientist Charles Epp has, in the context of the rights
revolution in the United States of the Warren and Burger eras, labeled "support
structures for legal mobilization":
[S]ustained judicial attention and approval for individual rights
grew primarily out of pressure from below, not leadership from
above. This pressure consisted of deliberate, strategic organizing
by rights advocates. And strategic rights advocacy became
possible because of the development of ... the support structure
for legal mobilization, consisting of rights-advocacy
organizations, rights-advocacy lawyers, and sources of
financing, particularly government-supported financing.9
The process that has come to bear on foreign nationals facing the death penalty
is just one example of an "international human rights support structure"
operating transnationally and domestically.9" The interventions as amici by
Enforcement and Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the United States and the
Rights of Consular Officers to Assist Them, available at http://travel.state.gov/consuLnotify.
html; Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Execution of Foreigner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at
A14 (discussing Letter from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Governor James S.
Gilmore III requesting stay of execution of Angel Breard); Memorandum from President George
W. Bush to the Attorney General, Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of
Justice in Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/
02/20050228-18.html (stating that "the United States will discharge its international obligations
under the decision of the International Court of Justice").
96 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 834c and 5028 (2005); People v. Ortiz, 2002 WL 937642 (Cal.
App. 2002); People v. Pathan, 2002 WL 31854948 (Cal. App. 2002); People v. Valencia, 2004
WL 887210 (Cal. App. 2004); People v. Garcia, 2005 WL 697970 (Cal. App. 2005); OR. REV.
STAT. § 181.642 (2005). But see State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573 (Or. 2005) (decided
before the Oregon statute was law, holding that the VCCR does not confer individual rights to
a detained foreign national to be asserted in a criminal proceeding).
97 CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTs REVOLUTION 2-3 (1998) (emphasis added). One difference
in the VCCR context is that foreign governments provided some of the financing.
9' Kathryn Sikkink has called general category "transnational advocacy networks." Kathryn
Sikkink, A Typology of Relations Between Social Movements and International Institutions, 97
AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROC. 301, 302-03 (2003).
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transnational NGOs and the European Union in the Roper v. Simmons99 case
which abolished the juvenile death penalty in the United States, and the
Supreme Court's explicit acknowledgments of the international standards in
its opinions in those cases are further examples of how international human
rights norms are creeping into the U.S. approach to a broad range of rights-
based claims.l ° °
Again, this is not a normative claim. There are those who are pleased to see
this process evolving and effecting change in the United States, either because
they want the death penalty abolished or they want the United States to engage
more actively with international human rights law, or both. There are others
who are dismayed by this development, either because they do not want the
death penalty abolished or they do not want the United States to feel bound to
follow the standards in international human rights treaties (particularly those
to which the United States has made reservations), or both.'' The point is that
transnational state and non-state actors are at work in changing U.S. practice.
D. Alternative Claims as Complements
In each of the examples I have given, actors (individual government
officials, NGO representatives, plaintiffs and defendants) behave for the most
part in pursuit of interests. However, only through an understanding of
alternative claims that challenge the primacy of the state actors and interstate
political process does a more complete picture of the international human
rights system emerge. But I do not intend to privilege these alternative theories
over rational choice.
Just as rational choice theory sweeps too broadly and undervalues the role
of non-state actors, transnational legal process theory tends to overestimate the
power of participation, and underestimate the power of change in political
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
100 See Brief for the Human Rights Committee of the Bar of England and Wales, Human
Rights Advocates, Human Rights Watch, and the World Organization for Human Rights USA,
2004 WL 1628523 (July 15,2004) and Brief of Amici Curiae the European Union and Members
of the International Community in Support of Respondent, 2004 WL 1619203 (July 12, 2004);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
10' Indeed, in his early writings Jack Goldsmith has expressed concern that "illegitimate"
international human rights litigation violates federalism and separation of powers doctrines. See,
e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human
Rights Litigation, 66 FoRD. L. REv. 319 (1997) (raising those critiques to the application of
customary international law of torture at a time the United States was not a signatory to the
Convention Against Torture).
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leadership and preference. It is nonetheless helpful in describing ways in
which treaties announce norms that can later become a reference point against
which individual government officials measure their own behavior.10 2
Governmental networks theory focuses on transnational governance-particularly
the judiciary-in ways that may miss important changes at the grassroots.
Moreover, while these networks are strong in some areas (antitrust, monetary,
and environmental regulation), they are weaker in the international human
rights system, where coordination of state behavior is less central. In the case
of emerging states, however, particularly those with a significant foreign and
international institutional presence, governmental networks play a larger role
in norm integration by providing technical assistance and aid aimed at building
legal systems and institutions that support international human rights
commitments.' °3 These networks offer a less complete explanation for how
change can and is taking place in democratic states on questions that deeply
divide them, e.g., the death penalty.
The theory of transnational communities of interest offers a useful
description of groups that develop and share expertise on human rights
problems that can fill the gaps in the governmental networks theory. At the
same time, the theory alone does not tell us much about how these
transnational communities go about effecting change at the domestic level. All
these constructivist approaches deserve further exploration and elaboration in
the international law literature through case studies. 3"
102 The last four years of internal debate over the standards to be applied to detainees captured
by the United States post-9/11 demonstrates the value of reference points. While the Geneva
Conventions norm appeared well integrated in the U.S. military, the expanded battlefield role
of the intelligence services and the desire to maintain detention facilities away from the
battlefield but outside the United States, shifted the benchmark. Once public attention was
brought to bear on abuses and deaths in detention that could be attributed to methods that do not
comply with the Geneva Convention, a focal point emerged for public and political support to
make the prior standard the law for all government agencies. See R. Jeffrey Smith & Josh White,
Cheney Plan Exempts CIA from Bill Barring Abuse of Detainees, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2005,
at A01; Sara Kehaulani Goo, List of Foiled Plots Puzzling to Some; White House Document
Mixes Half-Baked Plans with Serious Terrorist Threats, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 2005, at A06.
103 See INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, supra note 56.
104 The death penalty and VCCR case study is further elaborated in Margaret E. McGuinness,
Medellin, Norm Portals, and the Horizontal Integration of International Human Rights in US
Courts (forthcoming 2006).
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IV. THE CHALLENGE OF MEASURING COMPLIANCE
In my claim that the Limits theory adds little value to answering the
compliance question in international human rights law, I can be criticized for
not providing a unitary counter-theory. I have not done so in large part
because I think there is much that is helpful in the range of theoretical
perspectives (including instrumentalism) and room for "middle theories" that
do not seek to prove too much. But it is also because the empirical evidence
relating to compliance is rather thin. To properly address the challenge of
demonstrating compliance through empirical studies, two separate lines of
inquiry need to be pursued. The first frames the appropriate empirical
question: Is there a positive trend in the condition of human rights in the world
compared to fifty or sixty years ago when the modern age of human rights was
born? This basic empirical question turns out to be quite difficult to answer
with any degree of certainty and raises complicated questions about hierarchies
of rights. 5 Whatever the empirical data demonstrates in response to the first
answer, the follow-up question is even more vexing: To what degree can we
attribute the change in states' human rights practices to the increase in state
accession to human rights treaties as opposed to other factors, such as the fall
of communism or improved economic conditions? Theories of behavior can
be useful explanatory tools, but demonstrating causality is a notoriously
difficult task. As Robert Keohane noted about the challenge to the empirical
study of international institutions generally, outcomes are unreliable because
there is no alternative world against which to measure the world which
includes the United Nations and a multiplicity of regional organizations and
institutions." 6
Goldsmith and Posner's conclusion that a state will sign onto treaties
because "a state incurs little cost from violating the treaties"'107 acknowledges
that the available empirical evidence is, at best, limited. They note:
los Some recent studies are proving promising. See, e.g., Hathaway, supra note 80. But see
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 171 (2003) (arguing that Hathaway's study contained "serious deficiencies in her
empirical findings, theoretical model and policy prescriptions"). See Oona A. Hathaway, Testing
Conventional Wisdom, 14 EUR. J. INT'LL. 185 (2003).
"o Robert 0. Keohane, Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research, 45 INT'L J. 731, 738
(1990).
107 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 120.
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[Hiuman rights reports issued by the U.S. State Department,
Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch make clear that
human rights abuses in violation of the ICCPR are
widespread.... These reports suggest that the human rights
treaties have not had a large impact, but they say nothing about
the human rights treaties' possible marginal influence on human
rights practices."' 8
Indeed, the data from these different sources are not internally consistent' °9
Yet, they conclude that there is "no evidence that ratification affects human
rights practices,""' but that quantitative studies demonstrate "a statistical
relationship between democracy, peace and economic development" and
human rights."'
There are two responses to this. First, the scant empirical evidence cuts
both ways; there is no evidence that ratification of treaties affects human rights
practices and there is equally no evidence that it does not."12 Second, more
needs to be understood about the effect of the international human rights treaty
system on "democracy, peace and economic development," '113 particularly in
newly independent or post-totalitarian states that are most likely to have
acceded to binding norms at the time of transition. Indeed, in the domestic
context, an examination of the economic, political, sociological and
psychological causes for improvements in civil rights would not inexorably
lead to the conclusion that, "civil rights law has no exogenous effect on
behavior.""' 4 The authors' further conclusions that, "states do occasionally
coerce other states to improve their human rights practices, but this
log Id.
"09 See Steven C. Poe, Sabine C. Carey, & Tanya C. Vaszquez, How Are These Pictures
Different? A Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International
Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995, 23 HuM. RTs. Q. 650, 677 (2001) (noting differences
between the Amnesty International Annual Report on Human Rights and the U.S. State
Department's Annual Country Reports on Human Rights in the 1970s and 1980s).
"a GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 1, at 121.
." Id. at 122.
11 For an analysis of why measuring ratification might lead to inaccurate results, see
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 105.
"' See Schmitz & Sikkink, supra note 11, at 518.
114 Peter J. Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 445
(2006) (noting that many of Goldsmith and Posner's critiques of failure of international law-by
itself-to alter the behavior of states are equally valid in the domestic context and do not add
additional insight into the operation of international law).
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enforcement is episodic and correlates with the coercing state's strategic
interest," also sheds little light on the power of binding norms and their ability
to alter a state's "strategic interest." The "democratic peace" thesis suggests
that human rights considerations will always be part of a democratic state's
strategic interest. Disaggregating this interest from other strategic interests is
difficult.
V. THE NORMATIVE AGENDA
My final critique focuses on whether the central claim of the book is a
normative claim in positive clothing.11 5 From a socio-legal perspective, the
thesis of the book concerns how the United States (and it does appear
particularly aimed at a U.S. audience) should view international obligations.
If international law reflects rational acts subject to change in preferences, as
Goldsmith and Posner claim, then we need not wring our hands when the
United States changes its mind about a long-standing treaty commitment.
States need not be concerned about the notion of "legality" so long as the
actions taken are rationalized, according to the Limits authors. The claim that
international law is of limited utility can thus be used to support calls for
withdrawal from multilateral regimes that are framed as "not in the interest of
the United States," while shooting down the straw man that multilateral
regimes should be followed because they represent "law.""' 6 Goldsmith and
Posner provide a theoretical basis for states not to participate in certain
international law arrangements (e.g., The ICC, the Kyoto Protocol). But by
doing so, the book avoids the substantive debate over whether multilateralism
in certain cases may promote better results, including whether multilateral
regimes can transform domestic human rights practices.
The book does not engage directly on the content of legal rules; that it fails
to do so is a pity. Because it rejects the notion that international institutions
can ever play a transformative role, the Limits theory (intentionally or not)
provides an additional reason to reject international institutions categorically.
Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge, for example, that instrumentalist, welfare-
enhancing reasons for cooperating and participating in international
... See id.; Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in
International Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. (forthcoming 2006).
116 There are few international law scholars today who claim a treaty should be joined solely
on the ground that it represents a binding legal obligation. The substance of the obligation
matters.
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institutions may exist, even for powerful states like the United States. But they
give these arguments cursory, almost dismissive, treatment.'7 It thus appears
that while they support a theory of instrumentalism, it is limited to certain
kinds of instrumentalism. Their ultimate conclusion-"that some global
problems may simply be unsolvable"-belies their claim that the book is a
positive, not normative, account of preferences. If law truly is an instrument
of preference, it follows that it can be an instrument for a preference to solve
international problems, even, for example, a preference for the universal
observation and protection of human rights." 8
As others have noted," 9 the book cannot be viewed as separate from the
authors' broader normative project-a project that seeks to minimize U.S.
participation in international institutions and to limit the application of
international law in the United States by expanding presidential power and
limiting the role of the judiciary. 2° This important normative debate about
international law in the United States is taking place within a larger discussion
about the value of the rule of law internationally and the content of
international rules. To the extent that the Limits revival of the realist debate
prompts a new generation of scholars to engage in more rigorous analysis of
state behavior within the broader discussion of the international rule of law, it
is an important contribution. But the book has less value where it applies the
simplifying assumptions of rational choice to the international human rights
system. The complexity of issues, actors, and trends in human rights
demands-and deserves-more useful approaches.
"' Just one paragraph in the chapter addressing "liberal democracy and cosmopolitan duty"
restates the argument that "the welfare of U.S. citizens would be enhanced in the fairer, safer, and
more prosperous world that would result from increasing assistance to others." GOLDSMITH &
POSNER, supra note 1, at 206. The authors "have no quibble with this argument," but do not
spend much time discussing how it logically results in a normative conclusion quite at odds with
their own. Id.
118 Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L
& COMp. L. 305 (2006).
119 Id. (noting that even the descriptive elements of the book have normative implications);
Spiro, A Negative Proof of International Law, supra note 114. See also Hathaway & Lavinbuk,
supra note 115.
'20 JackGoldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, supra note 72; Bradley
& Goldsmith, supra note 101.

